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R. v. Sault Ste. Marie: A Comment
While courts are often criticized for failing to contribute to the 
reform of the law the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Sault Ste. M arie1 offers a good example of the constructive 
role they can play. In a landmark opinion Dickson J., speaking for the 
entire court, clarified the application of the mens rea doctrine to a broad 
range o f criminal and quasi-criminal offences contained in both federal 
and provincial legislation. In brief, Dickson J. upheld the availability 
of a “due diligence” defence in strict liability situations. His decision 
is one that Canadian lawyers should take careful note of.
Briefly summarizing the facts, the city of Sault Ste. Marie entered 
into a refuse disposal arrangem ent under which the contracting company 
was to furnish a site, labour, material and equipment. The site selected 
by the company backed on a spring-fed creek, which became polluted 
as a result of landfill operations. This led to the company being 
convicted under subsection 32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources Act, 
which sets out as follows:
32(1) Every municipality or person that discharges or deposits or causes or 
permits the discharge or deposit o f  any material o f any kind into or in any well, 
lake, river, pond, spring, stream, reservoir or other water or watercourse or on 
any shore or bank thereof or into or in any place that may impair the quality 
o f  the water o f  any well, lake, river, pond, spring, stream, reservoir or 
other water or watercourse is guilty o f  an offence and on summary convic­
tion is liable on first conviction to a fine o f not more than $5,000 and on each 
subsequent conviction to a fine o f not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term o f  not more than one year, or to both such fine and imprison­
ment.*
Efforts were also taken to prosecute the city, on the basis that it, 
as well, had “caused and perm itted” the offensive pollution. Following a 
variety of dispositions in lower courts3 the Supreme Court of Canada 
was asked to review the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
holding that the charge required proof of mens rea, that there had been 
no evidence adduced at trial to show mens rea and that a new trial 
should be held.
*(1978), 3 C.R. (3d) 30.
•R.S.O. 1970, c. 332.
*The charge was dismissed by the court o f first instance. On appeal de novo the city was convicted 
on the basis o f subsection 32(1) being a strict liability offence. In the Divisional Court the charge 
was found to be void for duplicity and the conviction set aside. It was also held that the charge 
required proof of mens rea. The Court o f Appeal held that the charge should not have been quashed 
on the ground of duplicity because there had been no challenge to the information at trial. It agreed, 
however, that mens rea was necessary. The Supreme Court o f Canada also dealt with the duplicity 
point and concluded that the charge was not defective on this account.
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Prior to outlining the basis upon which the Supreme Court of Canada 
reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal on the mens rea issue, a few general 
comments are in order. A major problem with holding that mens rea 
applies to offences such as the one under consideration is that it places 
a difficult burden on law enforcement officers to secure the necessary 
evidence to convince a court beyond reasonable doubt, or even on a 
balance of probabilities, that an accused had the necessary intent or 
knowledge to warrant a conviction. This is particularly so with respect 
to offences designed to enforce the regulation of industrial and other 
economic activities. Without a considerable investigative capacity, and 
the resources that this implies, the information necessary to enforce 
the law under a conventional criminal law model is often not available. 
And since these offences are usually regarded as less than “criminal” 
in the pure sense o f the term, the legislative and judicial compromise 
has been to support a concept o f strict liability under which liability 
will be imposed regardless of the intent or knowledge of the accused 
with respect to his actions. Mistake or ignorance of fact is no excuse 
when this doctrine is applied. Its justification lies in the need to protect 
broad social interests through expedient means; it represents “a shift 
of emphasis from the protection of individual interests to the protection 
of public and social interests”.4
On the other hand, the argum ent against strict liability stresses 
that when a mental requirement is regarded as unnecessary, the door is 
opened to the conviction o f persons who genuinely are innocent, in that 
they had no way to control the situation that gave rise to the charges 
brought against them. This is said to violate fundamental principles 
underlying penal liability.
The tension that necessarily flows from these conflicting outlooks 
has spawned a wealth of discussion in legal treatises and journals,5 as 
well as in decided cases.6 Various approaches have been suggested to 
reduce the unfairness of a traditional strict liability doctrine while 
retaining a measure of administrative efficiency in the enforcement of 
regulatory standards. A notable example is the recommendation of the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada that negligence should be the 
minimum standard of liability in regulatory offences.7 While the 
Commission agrees that it is acceptable to convict a person of a regulatory 
offence without proof of intent or knowledge, it recommends that an
4Supro, footnote 1, at 42.
'Dickson J., cites literature from England, Australia and Canada in discussing this question.
'A m ong the numerous cases cited by Dickson J. is the New Brunswick case o f R. v. A. O. Pope Ltd. (1972), 5 
N.B.R. (2d) 719, in which Keirstead J , held that the offence o f failing to provide properly fitted goggles 
contrary to the Industrial Safety Act was one of strict but not absolute liability, leaving it open to the accused to 
prove that the act was done without negligence or fault on his part.
’See, generally. The Meaning of Guilt, Working Paper 2 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
(Ottawa, 1974); Studies on Strut Liability, I.aw Reform Commission o f Canada (Ottawa, 1974); Our 
Criminal Law, Report o f the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa, 1976) 22-3, 32-3.
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accused should not be convicted if he can establish that he exercised 
due diligence to avoid the proscribed harm. He should always have the 
opportunity to relate sufficient of the circumstances of the violation 
to establish his innocence. The work of the Law Reform Commission, 
as well as innovative decisions in the lower courts of several provinces, 
were among the varied sources Dickson J. drew upon in R. v. Sault Ste. 
Marie in taking this important new direction in Canadian penal law.
What Dickson J. held was that the Crown need not establish mens 
rea, in the classic sense of intent or recklessness, in order to convict 
the City of Sault Ste. Marie under subsection 32(1) of the Ontario Water 
Resources Act. However, the mere establishing of the actus reus of 
pollution would not be sufficient to convict if the city could establish 
that it had exercised due diligence, i.e. that the pollution had not occurred 
owing to negligence on its part. The matter was sent back to the lower 
court to be retried on this basis.
To guide the lower court, Dickson J. enunciated the applicable 
principles. He found “compelling grounds” for the recognition ot three 
categories of offences rather than the traditional two:
1. O ffences in which mens rea, consisting o f  some positive state o f  mind such as 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either 
as an inference from the nature o f  the act committed or by additional evidence.
2. Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the 
existence o f  mens rea; the doing o f  the prohibited act prima facie imports the 
offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that he 
took all reasonable care. This involves consideration o f what a reasonable 
man would have done in the circumstances. T he defence will be available if 
the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set o f  facts which, if true, 
would render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps 
to avoid the particular event. These offences may properly be called offences 
o f  strict liability.. . .
3. Offences o f  absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to 
exculpate him self by showing that he was free o f  fault.
While the ascribing of offences to one of these three categories 
will involve “[t]he overall regulatory pattern adopted by the legislature, 
the importance of the penalty and the precision of the language 
used”,9 certain observations appear to be warranted. Clearly the pre­
sumption that mens rea applies in penal legislation will continue to prevail 
in relation to Criminal Code offences, as well as to federal and provincial 
offences that deliberately use such words as “wilfully”, “with intent”, 
“knowingly” or “intentionally”. But the presumption will not apply 
with respect to other offences; conceivably, most provincial offences will
1Supra, footnote 1, at 53-4. In providing these guidelines Dickson j .  was forced to explain two prior decisions 
o f the Court that were argued in support of absolute liability,/?. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1971 ]S.C.R. 5, andHitf 
v. R., [1975] 2 S C R .  402. Neither o f these authorities was felt to stand in the way of a defence of reasonable 
care, establishing only that the Crown need not prove knowledge on the part o f the accused.
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be treated as non-wiim rea offences. In these cases, however, the defence 
o f due diligence will be available unless the inference can clearly be 
drawn from the wording of the statute that the doctrine of absolute 
liability is to apply.10 An example of the far reaching scope of the second 
of the categories identified by Dickson J. is his inclusion of “cause or 
perm it” offences such as the one he had under consideration. While 
conceding that these words imply a certain mental dimension he con­
sidered that “the words ‘cause’ and ‘perm it’ fit much better into an 
offence of strict liability than either full mens rea or absolute liability”.11 
He added:
Since s.32(l) creates a public welfare offence, without a clear indication 
that liability is absolute and without any words such as "knowingly” or 
“wilfully” expressly to import mens rea, application o f the criteria which I have 
outlined above undoubtedly places the offence in the category o f  strict 
liability.12
What the impact of this decision will be in practical terms is not 
entirely clear. The argum ent has been made on several occasions that 
the recognition of a due diligence defence will not lead to a spate of 
acquittals because the existence of such a defence is a factor that is 
normally taken into account by enforcement officials when deciding 
whether or not to charge a person. Assuming this to be true in many 
cases, the major effect of Dickson J .’s judgm ent may be simply to transform 
such decisions from administrative into judicial ones, in the sense of 
providing the court with an opportunity to draw its own conclusions 
about whatever explanation may have been offered by an alleged 
violator to enforcement officials.
If  Sault Ste. Marie is to have a significant impact on the enforcement 
of regulatory legislation and is to provide new ammunition for creative 
defence lawyers, it is most likely to be in cases involving corporate 
violations. Dickson J. did not, in his judgm ent, adequately deal with the 
problems of applying the due diligence defence in situations (such as the 
case under consideration) in which the accused is a corporate body. He 
summarily dismissed this aspect of the case by suggesting that “[t]he 
availability o f the defence to a corporation will depend on whether 
such due diligence was taken by those who are the directing mind and 
will of the corporation itself.”13 His offhand reference to the House of 
Lords decision in Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass14 betrayed the difficulties
'•This will undoubtedly raise interesting new problems in the drafting and interpretation of legislative 
offences. For example, what is the effect o f this ruling on offences in the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 
1974 c.C-23, in view of the fact that Parliament has allowed selective application of a statutory due diligence 
defence in recent amendments: S.C. 1974-5-6, c. 76.
l 'Itnd. at 5b.
"Ibid.
islbid. at 58.
,4[ 1972] A.C. 153; [1971] All E.R. 127 (H.L.).
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that may be involved in settling upon a proper basis for evaluating when 
a corporate accused should be nela accountable for offences of negligence 
and who within the corporation should have the responsibility to exercise 
due diligence on its behalf.
Tesco adopted the conventional criminal law approach of looking 
to the director or manager who had actual control o f the company’s 
operations (the controlling mind and will o f the company in the traditional 
anthropomorphic jargon of the courts). But it is questionable whether 
liability for regulatory offences (which Dickson J. suggested “might well 
be regarded as a branch of administrative law to which traditional 
principles of criminal law have but limited application”15) should be 
tested by the same artificial measure as has been developed to test criminal 
culpability. Is it sufficient that a corporate accused merely establish 
that its controlling mind and will established a system of control that 
should have avoided the violation of the regulatory provision? The 
problem is that violations frequently occur despite control systems, and 
while negligence may be ascertainable at a given point within the system 
it may be virtually impossible to attribute negligence to senior manage­
ment. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada has pointed out:
The diffusion o f  responsibility within corporations having com plex  
organizational structures makes it difficult to determ ine whether due diligence 
has in fact been exercised, particularly where there is evidence o f  an un­
successful effort to set standards to avoid harm. Was the preventive action 
taken by those whom a court would regard as having primary responsibility 
for exercising due diligence? Perhaps the matter should have been dealt 
with at a higher level o f  the management structure. Where the standards 
effectively transmitted to those whose conduct caused the actual breach? 
Perhaps the man on the assembly line had not been informed o f  the pro­
cedures. Were the standards conscientiously enforced within the corpora­
tion? Perhaps there was a tacit understanding that sanctions would not be 
imposed by the employer on em ployees who failed to follow the procedures 
laid dow n.1*
As a policy matter surely the corporation should bear the risk o f a 
breakdown of its control system.
While there appears to be little indication from reported cases 
that enforcement difficulties have arisen under the several due diligence 
defences that presently exist under federal legislation,17 the result in
'*Supra, footnote 1, at 34.
l*Crtmmal Responsibility for Group Action, Working Paper 16 o f the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada (Ottawa, 1976) 25-6.
ITSee, e.g., R. v. Centre Dotson Ltd. (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 78, in which the accused corporation was charged 
under the Weights and Measures Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.36 in respect o f odom eter tampering. T he Act 
allowed an employer to escape conviction for the offence if it established that it had exercised “all due 
diligence to prevent its commission”. In considering whether the president, acting as the directing will of the 
corporate employer, had exercised due diligence, Bennett J., concluded that the supervision o f the wholesale 
aspect o f the business had been delegated to F, who had apparently participated in an agreement to reduce 
the mileage shown on the odometer. No controls or limitations were placed on F, in view of which the court 
determined that the company had not exercised due diligence. T he court proceeded on the basis that it was 
the president in this case who would have had to exercise due diligence on behalf of the company in o rder to 
establish the defence.
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Tesco18 suggests that the larger the corporation is, and the more centralized 
its management, the easier it may be to evade liability and the more 
difficult and costly it may become to enforce public welfare standards 
through regulatory offences. If governments are to continue to use these 
offences as a means o f regulating corporate behaviour, adherence to the 
Tesco approach may place an unrealistic burden on officials seeking to 
enforce them. In practice there will likely be many situations in which 
it will be extremely difficult to obtain the necessary information to rebut 
the excuses that will inevitably be advanced by senior management of 
large corporations. Unless courts are prepared to relax their view of 
“who acts for the corporation” under the existing test,19 a new test may 
be advisable to exclude due diligence as a defence where those to whom 
senior management has delegated supervisory responsibilities have failed 
to exercise reasonable care to ensure that a control system operates 
effectively.20
While this issue may not surface in the retrial of the municipal 
corporation o f Sault Ste. Marie for polluting Cannon Creek, the issue of 
corporate due diligence is one that takes on new importance in view of 
Dickson J .’s broad application of the defence to most regulatory offences. 
These, after all, are the offences that are most frequently charged 
against corporations. In fairness, Dickson J., in Sault Ste. Marie, had 
neither the occasion nor the information to deal with this question in
'*In this case a large corporation owning several hundred supermarkets had instituted a system 
under which superior servants were instructed to supervise inferior servants to avoid acts that might 
lead to the commission o f an offence. Due to the negligence of a store manager in supervising 
an employee products were sold at more than the advertised special price. In a questionable 
decision from a policy standpoint the corporation was held to have exercised due diligence despite 
the breakdown of the system at the managerial level by the person to whom supervisory responsi­
bilities had been delegated. The result may, however, be peculiar to the wording of the due 
diligence defence in question, which allowed an accused to escape liability for the act or default of 
"another person”, i.e. a person other than the company. If so, the Tesco approach may be o f limited 
application in o ther cases.
"A  case in which a court has expanded the doctrine of attribution by extending the “controlling mind and 
will" o f the corporation to an employee acting in a supervisory capacity is R. v. Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd. 
(1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (Alta. Dist. Ct.). The accused corporation was convicted o f fraud arising from the 
activities of its used car sales m anager in turning back the odometer o f used cars prior to sale. Legg J., at 137, 
found "that it was the policy o f the accused corporation to delegate to him the sole active and directing will’ of 
the corporation in all matters relating to the used car operation o f the company, and as such he was its 
directing mind and will."
,#For example, in R. v. Centre Dotson iJd., supra, footnote 17, one might speculate about the result had the 
president issued explicit guidelines to F, and had the offensive behaviour been that of a subordinate 
employee acting under F's supervision. Would the diligence o f the president in issuing guidelines to F have 
been sufficient to acquit if it had been established that F had been negligent in supervising the employee in 
question? Note the test suggested by the l.aw Reform Commission of Canada in Crrmmal Responsibility for 
Group Action, supra, footnote 16, at 27 that "corporations should be allowed to show that all reasonable care to 
prevent an offence was taken by officers and employees to whom supervisory responsibilities were 
delegated". It may well be that such a test would have to be implemented by legislation. Fora recent example 
of an attempt to incorporate such a test within a statutory provision see Employment Standards Code, Bill 76 ,4th 
Session, 48th Legislature, New Brunswick, 27 Elizabeth II, 1978, s. 101: "Where an employer is prosecuted 
under this Act the act or omission of an employee shall be deemed to be the act o r omission o f the employer 
unless the employer establishes that the act o r omission occured despite the fact the employer, and each 
employee exercising supervisory responsibilities on behalf o f the employer, took all reasonable care to avoid 
it."
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any depth and could not reasonably have been expected to consider the 
adequacy of the existing test for corporate responsibility. Hopefully, 
his endorsem ent of Tesco will not deter much needed reconsideration of 
this issue. The problem is one that bears watching in future cases.
In conclusion, while it is perhaps prem ature to gauge the impact 
of R. v. Sault Ste. Marie on the day to day activities of those whose 
responsibility it is to enforce regulatory legislation, from a lawyer’s 
perspective the decision is one that is likely to be widely acclaimed on at 
least two counts: first, it offers sanctuary from the harshness and potential 
inequity of the doctrine o f absolute liability; second, it reaffirms that 
despite the burgeoning activity of legislatures and law reform agencies, 
judicial law reform remains an active ingredient o f our evolving legal 
system.21 The Supreme Court o f Canada has captured the momentum 
generated by a num ber of people and institutions over several years to 
formalize this much needed reform of Canadian penal law.
ALAN D. REID*
“ Note the approach taken by Dickson J. in the following paragraph, supra, footnote 1, at 53:
it may be suggested that the introduction o f a defence based on due diligence and 
the shifting o f the burden of proof might better be implemented by legislative act. In 
answer, it should be recalled that both the concept o f absolute liability and the 
creation o f a jural category o f public welfare offences are the product of the judiciary 
and not of the legislature. The development to date o f this defence, in the 
num erous decisions I have referred to o f courts o f this country as well as in Australia 
and New Zealand, has also been the work o f judges. The present case offers the 
opportunity of consolidating and clarifying the doctrine.
•B.C.L. (U.N.B.), LL.M. (Yale). Professor, Faculty o f Law, University o f New Brunswick.
